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This work project is an empirical study on the key price driven factors of the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme. The research examines the prices on the secondary 
market, from 2009 until 2016, comprehending the second and third phases of the program, 
performed with an Ordinary Least Squares regression. The independent variables under the 
scope of this project are not only energy based, but also structured spreads, economic 
growth proxies and a temperature dispersion indices. 
 
First, the results are due to respect of the whole period to present a global picture of the 
main determinants on the carbon price changes then, the sample is divided according with 
institutional measures to avoid over allocation and price instability. 
 
Evidence suggests the impact of energy-related variables such as Brent, Coal and the Power 
Price in Germany and in the U.K. on the price of European Union Allowances, especially 
during the 3
rd
 phase of the scheme. Moreover, fluctuations in the coefficients and in the 
explanatory variables are highly related with institutional changes on the European 
program. 
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As one of the most recent trends, emissions trading is currently facing a period of 
unparalleled development all over the globe, alongside with new investment products 
copulated with a green label that are prompt to take over the global markets sooner than 
expected.  
 
Emissions Trading Scheme, a fairly new trading platform available on several countries 
around the globe, is expected to be one of the main contributors to limit global warming up 
to 2ºC
1
, as agreed in one of the most recent climate conferences in Paris 2015. However, 
several questions have been raised on how efficient carbon markets currently are and what 
is driving price changes. 
 
To access how efficient is a scheme and, therefore, how likely it is to contribute to the 
abatement of emissions, I will perform an empirical model with the main goal to explain 
price movements of the European Carbon Price. I will evaluate the significance of external 
determinants, such as energy prices or macroeconomic environment and, at some extend, 
the impact of institutional changes on the spot price, throughout a 7-years period. 
 
My results show empirical evidence of the impact of institutional changes on the European 
Union Allowance Spot price and the main key determinants, especially for the 3
rd
 phase of 
the scheme.  





Greenhouse gases (GHG) is used as a reference when describing gases that are trapped in 
the atmosphere. According with EPA
2
, in 2014 Carbon Dioxide (CO) was responsible for 
81% of the total GHG emissions in the U.S. The other relevant gases are Methane (CH4) 
11%, Nitrous Oxide (6%) and Fluorinated Gases (3%). Table 1, in the appendix, describes 
the level of global warming with CO2 as indicator
3
. As it is possible to observe, 1kg of CH4 
causes 25 times more warming over a 100 year period than the same amount of CO2, 
meaning that even if it is present in a smaller percentage, CH4 is highly prejudicial. 
 
An Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is a policy instrument for managing GHG emissions
4
. 
It was simply described in a British newspaper article as an upper limit on the total amount 
of GHG emissions allowed for emitters within the ETS jurisdiction. Entities are obliged to 




To do so, emitters acquire an Emission Allowance (EA), which was formal defined by the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
6
 (EU ETS) as a permit to emit one ton of CO 
equivalent during a specific period, which shall be transferable, therefore, tradable. The 
term has been extended to cover the other GHG throughout the years. 
 








The Cap-and-Trade (CAT) strategy is a mechanism that sets an absolute limit on the total 
emissions while allows EAs to be traded among other covered entities. A common opposite 
example of this strategy is a Baseline-and-Credit system that defines a cap, such as relative 
target, only allowing emission reductions that go beyond it to be used as sellable credits, 
commonly described as an offset mechanism. ETS is used a reference for both these 
systems. 
 
Fig. 1 - The cap-and-trade system. Source: The Government of Quebec. 
The political feasibility of each scheme cannot be excluded from the discussion table since 
it is highly related to not only to the requirements for participation and consensus, but also 
to the transaction costs. As, in every scheme, players need to agree on a common regulatory 
framework, this is one of the most crucial aspects of my research as it institutional changes 
have a direct impact on the carbon price. 
Helm (2003) argues that bargaining over burden-sharing becomes a strategic game on 
which self-interested players have an incentive to free-ride on the mitigations efforts by 
implementing lower targets, leading to negotiations of emissions budgets as the most 
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determinant blocking point in the creation of a climate policy, preventing high levels of 
participation in integrated trading schemes and, ultimately, the integration of multiple 
schemes into one unique framework. This is especially true when looking into the Western 
Climate Initiative, on which we observe a constant in-and-out flow of participants. 
 
Dark spread is a measure used to evaluate the returns over fuel costs of coal-fired power 
plants.
7
 It accounts with the power price ($/MWh) and the fuel costs, including both the 
cost of the fuel ($/MMBtu) and the transportation costs ($/MMBtu), the calorific value 
(MMBtu/ton) and the heat rate (MMBtu/MWh). Like the dark spread, the spark spread 
measures the returns from selling a unit of electricity over a gas-fired plant, take into 
consideration the power price, gas price and heat rate. 
Clean Dark and Spark spreads were introduced as an adjustment to the original metrics 
described above. Both consider the indicative prices of emissions
8
, with the purpose to 
evaluate changes in production costs of electricity generation and the economic incentives 




When an enterprise issue stocks or bonds for the first time and sell them directly to 
investors, those transactions take place on the primary market. Furthermore, any other 
transaction on the same assets is done on the secondary market. Both primary and 
secondary markets concepts are also applied to emissions trading and will described in 
more detail in section 4. 





3. Emissions Trading 
 
 
As part of a global effort to decrease of GHG emissions, the Kyoto Protocol signed in 
December 1997 was a major step in the recognition of the theoretical benefits of allowing 
emission reductions to be obtained at least cost through an international trading system of 
allowances. However, unlikely as it is wrongly refer to, the emission trading’s roots were 
not introduced in Kyoto but by a pioneer American system back in 1972. 
 
A computer-based system was used to compare the cost and effectiveness of various 
multiple strategies (Burton And Sanjour, 1967). With access to several American cities 
emissions data, each strategy was compared with the least costly combination to achieve a 
specific abatement level, a common procedure in multiple environment related experiences. 
In 1972, after several improvements on these computer-assisted models, the newly created 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) introduced in its annual report the concept of 
CAT. 
 
After the Gestation phase, the second stage took off with the Proof of Principle and the 
Clean Air Act in 1977
10
, two of the most important marks in emissions trading history. The 
Clean Air Act consisted in an offset-mechanism where a company would be able to buy 
allowances from the Act after negotiate with another peer a decrease in the same degree, a 
similar mechanism is used today. 
 
                                                 
10 www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act 
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In the first 15 years of the Amendments became law (1972-1987), intensive polluters 
industries faced several losses in their income due to the newly abatement ruling 
(Greenstone, 2001). Even if losses were substantial, they were modest when compared to 
the size of the entire manufacturing sector, which suggested that new regulation 
implemented deterred the growth of polluters, which contradicts the overall aim of the 
program, the reduction of air pollution yet, never at the expenses of a specific sector.  
 
Moreover, the U.S. Acid Rain Program introduced in the 1990 Clean Air Act
11
, part of the 
third stage, aimed to reduce the Sulfur Dioxide (SO) emissions of electricity and was the 
world’s first large-scale implementation of such a program, introducing a banking behavior 
in which pollution allowances could be used or stored, and buyers were able to resell them 
after, one of the features observed in today’s schemes. The European Union also undertook 
an ambitious effort to provide a carbon price signaling thanks to the introduction of an 
European tax on energy and carbon in the early 90’s. Eventually, this effort would fail since 
an unanimous agreement between all member states was required but, unfortunately, not 
achieved. Nevertheless, the standpoints for the Kyoto Protocol were launched for what 
would be the revolution of emissions trading. 
 
After the 1997 meeting, an agreement to reduce GHG emissions through different 
mechanisms was reached. Emissions trading schemes were part of the solution and started 
to be planned and developed by different regions all over the globe ever since. The Protocol 




was considered a landmark in environmental protection especially due to the collaboration 
of multiple nations, even without the ratification of the U.S.  
 
The next figure summarizes the emissions trading history described until the Paris 
Agreement ratified in 2015. 
 
Fig. 2 – Emissions trading timeline. 
 
The implications of the Paris’ Agreement will not be taken into detail. Regardless, it was a 
clear breakthrough to reduce GHG emissions and further necessary considerations 
regarding its mandates will be duly pointed out. 
4. EU ETS 
 
As previously stated, each ETS has different core fundamentals on its conception, mainly 
due to institutional legislation, which will eventually need to be carefully weighted for a 
better model approximation. However, since all the schemes, with the exception of the EU 
ETS, are fairly new there is not enough data to replicate the methodology used in this 
research for other schemes. As so, in this section I will emphasize the main features of the 
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program, while mentioning impactful institutional changes among the other trading 
schemes that should be taken into account for future research purposes. 
 
The EU ETS was the first large-scale GHG trading program, launched back in 2005, being 
since then widely known as the more developed scheme in the emissions trading scope. It 
currently covers more than 11,000 energy-using installations within 3 major industrial 
sectors, such as power and heat stations, over 31 countries
12
.  On the other hand, one of its 
American peers, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) only covers 9 United 
States, representing a total of about 23% of the GHG emissions
13
, while the Western 
Climate Initiative faced multiple changes in its affiliates during the years and, 
consequently, the total covered range has been adjusted since the start of the program. 
 
Figure 3 shows the main sectors which contribute the most for GHG emissions in the 
Eurozone. Public power and heat sectors account for more than half of the 2015 emissions 
in Europe and Germany was responsible for about 25% of them followed closely by the 
U.K. and Poland as the main emitters. The weight and relevance of those countries is also 
applied for other sectors such as metals or oil and gas and it is the main reason for both 
Germany and the U.K. figures are the proxies used in some variables, in order to capture 
the main emitters inside the EU ETS and to analyze power prices and related spreads. For 
future developments, I would suggest to also include Poland’s prices as a proxy for the EU 
energy market and heavier GHG emitters. 





Fig. 3 – Emissions in 2015 by Sector. Source: Reuters Point Carbon. 
The European scheme is mandatory for all the 28 EU member states, with the additional 
participation of Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, covering approximately 45% of the 
total EU’s GHG emissions, targeting 57% of the 2005 level by 2030, far more than any 
other scheme in place at the moment. The goal however, is to increase the total percentage 
year by year with the addition of new facilities or sectors. 
 
Working under the CAT principle, the EU sets a threshold to limit GHG emissions and 
then, distributes or sells European Union Allowances (EUA). The total amount of permits 
is reduced over time and companies, which emitted less than the correspondent EUA 
acquired, can sell the excess to other facilities.
14
 There is no price floor, opposite to the 2$ 
mark set by the RGGI in 2012, which increases annually at a rate of 2.5%. Another 
remarkable different mechanism in place is the New Zealand ETS, which sets a price 
ceiling of 25$ to avoid constrains for local facilities that compete overseas
15
, alongside 
being the only scheme not working with the CAT mechanism. The scheme uses an 
intensity-based system which allows enterprises to charge the final client for the emission 




cost, rather similar to a carbon tax. With great results so far in decreasing the GHG 
emissions, the success of this approach is being currently studied by other countries and 
schemes as an alternative to the CAT traditional approach. 
 
Domestic and international offsets are possible until the end of the 3
rd
 phase, meaning a 
company can invest in a project that lower GHG emissions, such as forestry, creating an 
offset credit that can be either used or sold, typically at a lower price than purchased.
16
 
Borrowing is possible within the trading period but not between stages, while banking is 
unlimited. Trading is also possible on Over-The-Counter (OTC) markets and organized 
exchanges. As it will be explained later, the secondary market will be the one captured by 
the dependent variable of my empirical model. There are multiple exchanges offering EU 
ETS Allowances derivative products such as the European Energy Exchange (EEX) or the 
European Climate Exchange (ECX), futures contracts for example, traded at the ICE and 
other exchanges, which are more liquid, thus highly appreciated for hedging or speculation 
purposes. 
 
Due to the price turmoil of the first two stages, a considerable shift in the EAs allocation 
strategy was taken to surpass the pricing mechanism established before. The first phase 
lasted until 2007, as a “learning by doing” trading period, characterized by an excessive 
number of EAs, freely distributed, resulting in a price sunk. Similar behaviors were 
observed in other schemes all around the globe, however on a much lower scale than the 
                                                 
16 www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/science/a-price-tag-on-carbon-as-a-climate-rescue-plan.html?hp&_r=1 
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EU ETS, as they had the time to readjust the scheme accordingly with the European 
backlash. 
 
Currently, auctions of EUAs are hold by the EEX and ICE, depending on which country are 
the EUAs attributed to. Nevertheless, the most common auction is hold for the whole EU 
by the EEX. Purchasing one contract entitles one EUA, which accounts for 1 ton of CO2 
equivalent. The tick size is 0.01€ per allowance and the delivery day is one day after the 
auction. For the sake of clarity, the primary market is a reference for these auctions, i.e., 
whenever a new EUA is launched.
17
 Secondary markets are available in emissions trading, 
specifically for the EUAs. In fact, due to daily quote availability, the secondary market will 
be the one under study, more precisely the one offered by EEX since 2005. I will consider 
EUA prices, meaning I will not include the aviation sector, due to its recent inclusion in the 
EU ETS scope and the fact they are traded separately. 
 
Seen as a case study in what could go wrong and, as previously highlighted, EU legislators 
were not careful enough in setting the initial cap, letting companies to easily achieve their 
targets and permit prices quickly depreciated. Hintermann (2009) underlines the additional 
influence on the price volatility due to special weather conditions such as high summer 
temperatures and low precipitation. To confirm his claim, I use a proxy for temperature 
dispersions, which will allow me to either refute or accept his findings. Alongside, over-
allocation started to became an issue, not only per country but also per sector (Neuhoff, 




Karsten et al., 2006), setting even more pressure on the EU to readjust the scheme 
accordingly to avoid more price turbulence. 
 
Fig. 4 - Short and long positions by country and sector. Source: Kettner et al. (2006). 
The electricity sector was short, while non-electricity industrial sectors were long. At the 
same time, a net short position is clearly seen among the EU15 member states has the major 
preference, while the vast majority of the new EU10 members, e.g., Lithuania and Latvia, 
were long. 
 
During the second phase, free allocation represented about 92% of the total Cap
18
, while on 
the current stage it only accounts for about 43%, being auctions the main mechanism used 
to guarantee carbon permits. To achieve this, the regulators decreased by 6.5% the total 
number of EAs. However, once the global financial crisis hit, the economic downturn 
resulted in the cut of GHG emissions and thus demand. Carbon prices sunk once again yet 
showing a more stable pattern. 
 
New Entrants Reserves (NER) are up to 5%, allowing for new participants in the scheme 
and cost containment and price support measures will be heavily supported in 2019, thanks 
                                                 
18 www.i4ce.org 
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to a Market Stability Reserve
19
 (MRS), a long-term solution with a special focus on 
providing indirect pricing support by removing surplus allowances. On contrast, the New 
Zealand ETS leaves no room for new entrants within each compliance period. Back-loading 
was introduced in the 3
rd
 phase to postpone the auctioning off 900M allowances from 2014-
2016 until 2019/2020, and is expected to rebalance the supply and demand equilibrium, 
reducing carbon pricing volatility. A linear reduction factor was applied to the decrease the 
overall cap by 1.74%, from 2008 until the beginning of the 3
rd
 phase, eventually reaching 
2.2% by 2030 accordingly within the climate and energy policy framework representing, on 
average, almost 2.0% per year, from 2013 until 2020, without accounting with commercial 
aviation. Such amendments have been proven to be highly impactful on the EUA price, 
especially on the primary market. However, they are phased, i.e., impossible to quantify 
their impact on daily data. As so, even if they are not included directly in my empirical 
model, they will be considered by splitting the sample per period accordingly. 
 
As previously pointed out, the EU ETS is, without a doubt, a starting point on which other 
schemes proceeded to learn not only from its main accomplishments in the abatement of 
GHG emission, but also by its adjustments and continuous refurbishing. For future 
research, other significant scheme related aspects should be taken into account. 
5. Price Driven Factors 
 
The usage of Carbon Allowances is a function of the expected emissions per emitter. As so, 
the level of emissions depends on several factors such as fluctuations in energy 
                                                 
19 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform/index_en.htm 
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consumptions and production, traditional energy-based prices like coal, oil, etc., extreme 
weather conditions and finally, economic power. On the other hand, carbon prices are also 
determined by institutional decisions as mentioned. For example the amount available for 
emitters and further banking or borrowing limitations, new entrants reserves or price 
support measures, will have a direct effect on the auctioning price practiced. 
 
Ellerman and Buchner (2007) argued the carbon price during the first stages of the 
European Scheme was mainly determined by allowances allocation issues – auctioning, 
benchmarking, new entrant provisions and over-allocation – institutional related 
mechanisms. In the next two sections, I will enunciate the main price determinants fact and, 
at the same time, group them by either supply or demand determinants, based on their 
source, either institutional or external, respectively. 
5.1 Supply Determinants 
 
As in the traditional energy based markets such as coal or oil, the demand and supply 
equilibrium is the main responsible for price movements of the respective underlying. On 
the supply side, as previously mentioned in this research, the number of allowances and 
their distribution is a key factor when assessing the final carbon price, much like Brent 
production cuts. Ellerman and Buchner (2007) argue the ratio between allocated allowances 
and actual emissions was the first signal of over-allocation which, according with the 
evidence presented, eventually led to a price drop during the first phase, as economics 
agents quickly realized too many allowances were being distributed. In accordance with 
their conclusions, evidence shows the close relationship between EUA spot and futures 
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price during the first phase, while that relationship slowly fade away after the first 
compliance break. (Alberola et al., 2008) 
 
Another equally important institutional decision was the ban of transferring any banked or 
borrowed allowances between the first phases of EU ETS. Alberloa and Chevallier (2009) 
underline that due to the worthless of an allowance after December 2007, market 
imperfections found during the initial stage of the European regime, also impacted the cost-
of-carry relationship between EUA spot and futures, which did not hold after the 
restrictions were implemented. 
 




 phases, I argue 
that the progressive cap reduction, alongside with changes in NER, International offsets 
credits, cost and price containment measures and the share of allowances freely distributed 
on the total EUA distributed will have a significant impact on the carbon price. 
 
The annual cap, on average during the 2
nd
 stage was about 2M ton per year, exactly the 
same as in the beginning of the 3
rd
 phase. However, during the current stage this limit is 
reduced by 1.74% on a yearly basis, as mentioned in section 4. Auction allocations, which 
account for a total of only 3% during the 2
nd
 phase are now about 57% of the total Cap. 
NER increased from 520M ton to 780M ton and the total credit limit in International offsets 
is also higher (more 200M ton than on the 2
nd
 compliance period. Cost containment 
measures were not in place during the 2
nd
 stage but there is now a 6-month period on 
which, if prices are three times higher than the average price of the previous two years, 
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member states may increase auction volumes directly from NER. Price support measures 
will be implemented slowly as stated in the previous sections
20
. 
The impact of these changes and how it will be considered in the empirical model will be 
explained in the respective section. 
5.2 Demand Determinants 
 
The link between ETS and more traditional energy markets is widely accepted in the 
academic research. According with Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007), weather variables such 
as extreme temperatures have a direct influence on the EUA spot price. Furthermore, 
Alberola et al. (2008) argue that weather variations (high temperatures, rainfalls, strong 
winds), especially when not correctly anticipated, have a strong relationship with carbon 
price movements, on line with what we observed with other traditional energy markets. 
Cold winters and hot summers tend to increase the need for heating and, as so, the 
consumption of electricity hikes during these periods. The same principle applies to oil 
consumption during summer due to the holiday season, as people drive longer periods. 
Christiansen et al. (2005) and Hintermann (2010) researches help in the defense of these 
arguments, which taken together, explain why climate variations are widely accepted in the 
scientific and academic literature as one of the key carbon price driven factors. The 
reasoning behind is straight forward, if a fluctuation in the demand for electricity or fuel 
occurs, emitters need to acquire more EUA fulfill such demand thus, the carbon price will 
change. However, previous literature do not access when do entities hedge their emissions, 
which would be expected to affect the carbon spot price immediately and then, not capture 
by using an extreme weather proxy. My assumption is those fluctuations are explained by 
                                                 
20 Point Carbon - Reuters 
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temperature deviations from the average directly, without accounting with the likeability of 
other severe weather phenomenon occur. 
 
A given fact when discussing the demand for fossil fuels is the relationship between their 
absolute price and relatives or possible substitutes. As so, the fuel switching costs 
associated with a departure from an highly carbon-intensive source to lower ones constitute 
another important determinant for the carbon spot. Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010) 
performed a Granger causality test to analyze the impact of gas, coal and electricity prices 
on the EUA spot and forward price, with statistical proven results for the first two phases. 
Multiple literatures also corroborate the same reasoning, as evidence suggests, Brent prices 
to be the main determinant for natural gas prices which, consequently, affect carbon prices 
(Kanen 2006), especially due to being one of the main fuels used by the larger emitters, 
who have an obvious interest in the price they are charged per ton of CO2 equivalent 
emissions. As so, these variables will also be taken into account by my model. 
 
With the introduction of the EU ETS, power operators need also to account with the 
possibility of making extraordinary profits if they switch from traditional energy sources 
such as coal and natural gas to cleaner sources. The now clean spreads
21
 introduces a new 
equilibrium in the old framework – as long as the carbon price is below this switching 
price, coal plants are more profitable than gas plants – which turns to be the three 
profitability indicators to determine the preferred fuel used by power plants (Alberola et al., 
2008). Kanen (2006) argues the switching price is more sensitive to natural gas prices than 
                                                 
21 As calculated by the Caisse des Dépôts – Climate Task Force for Tendances carbone. 
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coal price changes and so, to measure this claim I will use a comparative metric between 
the two, which is described in section 7. The clean and dark spreads will also be used as a 
measurement of the impact in the gross profit of a power plant considering the carbon price. 
 
Declercq et al. (2011) investigate how the economic turmoil during the financial crisis in 
2008 and 2009 impacted the lower carbon price during the time, stressing the importance of 
the worldwide economy with a counterfactual simulation. There are also other links 
between macroeconomic and financial market indicators and carbon markets analyzed until 
today, from European electricity company returns to stock and bond markets, multiple 
literature emphasizes the possible correlation between external factors on the price of 
EUAs. Chevallier (2011) shows EUA prices move in the opposite direction if in the 
presence of a recessionary shock, meaning they are negatively correlated with 
macroeconomic global indicators. To take this into account, I will use a proxy for the 
European economy, the STOXX 600, which will give me an indicator of how well the main 
enterprises and the overall economy in Europe are doing throughout the period under study. 
 
Finally, I will leave open questions and general considerations regarding other possible 
determinants of the EUA price in the last chapter. 
6. Research Question 
The objective of this research is to explain the carbon price movements from 2009 to 2016. 
To answer this properly it is necessary to include a set of variables (determinants) that 
might, or not, influence the price. To do so, I will account with all the drivers mentioned 
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before on this study, aiming to obtain a clear picture of what are the key determinants, and 
how impactful each one is.  
As previously highlighted, due to the impossibility of extending this research to other 
trading schemes, I will base my study on the EU ETS only. My dependent variable is then 
the price traded in OTC, more precisely the one quoted by EEX. The reason behind this 
selection is purely related with access to a wider range of data, in contrast to the one 
available in the primary market. The motivation behind it is to strengthen the research in 
carbon markets, including an historical perspective on how prices have evolved and what is 
driving them. Further considerations regarding the model and data will be addressed in the 
next sections. 
7. Empirical Methodology 
The model used to describe the price variation of EU ETS prices over time is an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression. 
 
Arguably the most widely used method for fitting linear statistical models, on which the 
robustness of the hypothesis tests and confidence interval depends on the extent to which 
the model’s assumptions are verified (Hayes and Cai 2007). An OLS model assumes the 
coefficients are not random yet fixed values across the period, the standard errors are 
uncorrelated random variables and finally, assumes constant variance or, what is known as 
homoscedasticity. The final goal is to express EUAs prices, the dependent time-series, as a 
function of independent variables. As so, the following model expresses the one used as the 
starting point for this research. 
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𝐷(𝑬𝑼𝑨) = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝐷(𝑩𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕) + 𝛾𝐷(𝑪𝒐𝒂𝒍) + 𝛿𝐷(𝑵𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍𝑮𝒂𝒔) + 𝜂𝐷(𝑷𝑷𝑫𝑬) + 𝜃𝐷(𝑷𝑷𝑼𝑲)
+ 𝜄𝐷(𝑪𝑫𝑺𝑫𝑬) + 𝜅𝐷(𝑪𝑫𝑺𝑼𝑲) + 𝜆𝐷(𝑺𝑺𝑫𝑬) + 𝜇𝐷(𝑺𝑺𝑼𝑲) + 𝜈𝐷(𝑺𝟔𝟎𝟎) + 𝜏𝑻𝑫𝑬
+ ϣ𝑻𝑼𝑲 +  𝐷(𝑺𝑷) +  𝜖 
Equation 1 – OLS regression within all variables under scope. 
Where 𝛼 is the constant and 𝜖 the residuals of the regression, while other remaining Greeks 
represent the coefficient of each variable on the OLS regression. “Brent”, “Coal” and 
“NaturalGas” are the variables attributed to the respective commodities’ prices. “PPDE” 
and “PPUK” represent the power price on Germany and United Kingdom. “CDSDE”, 
“CDSUK”, “SSDE” and “SSUK” are the clean dark spread and the clean spark spread on 
Germany and in the U.K., respectively. “S600” is the close price of the STOXX Europe 
600 Index. The “TDE” and “TUK” are “temperature dispersion indices”, with respect to 
Germany and U.K., separately and finally the “SP” represents the switching price from a 
Coal to a Natural Gas based plant, or vice-versa. Clean dark and spark spreads are 
calculated based on the methodology used by S&P Global Platts. 




−  𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
Equation 2 – Clean Spread formula. Source: S&P Global Platts. 
𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 
𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
−  𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
Equation 3 – Clean Spark formula. Source: S&P Global Platts. 
 
While the first part of equation 2 (eq. 2) is the widely used dark, or spark spread in case of 
equation 3, depending on the fuel used to generate power, the last entrance represents the 
influence of the carbon price on the overall gross profit per MWh of a power plant.  For the 
Germany spreads the emissions factor used was 0.96 tCO2/MWh and 0.73 tCO2/MWh for 
dark and spark spreads, respectively. For the U.K., I used 0.98 tCO2/MWh and 0.38 
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tCO2/MWh, in accordance with the recommendations from the Tendences Carbone 
monthly bulletin.
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 Energy conversion factor used for the Steam Coal power plant was 7.1 
(converting 1 metric ton of coal into MWh) and the efficiency about 0.36 for Germany 
plants and 0.35 for U.K. ones. The fuel efficiency ratio already considers the heat rate for 
both fuels. For the Natural Gas based plants, the Fuel efficiency ratio used for Germany 
Natural Gas plants was 0.5 and 0.49 for the U.K. Once again, all the fixed figures are 
according with the last specifications published by S&P Global Platts report on European 
Electricity Assessments and Indices. I decided to use the same fuels for both the German 
and the U.K. market as recommended by the CDC Climat Research; however, for further 
research it can also be considered other sources of natural gas such as the TFT gas for the 
German Spark Spread or the NBP gas for the U.K. spread. Regarding the proxy used for 
Coal, it is still the more commonly used by U.K. and Germany plants. 
 
Finally, to estimate the switching price, i.e., when it starts to be more profitable for a power 
plant to switch from Coal to Natural Gas and vice-versa, I follow the methodology from the 





Equation 4 – Switching price, economically advantageous. Source: I4CE. 
On which the “cost(fuel)/MWh” is the production cost of one MWh of electricity, using 
Natural Gas or Coal as fuels, similar to the costs computed for the Dark and Spark spread, 
while “tCO2(fuel)/MWh” is the emissions factor of a conventional plant. All the four 




spreads considered and switching price metric were converted to €/MWh whenever 
necessary. 
 
The temperature dispersion index was build considering the daily average temperature of 
the last 35 years (1970-2005) and the distance to the mean of the daily actual observed 
temperature each day of the period under study. As so, a negative value represents a colder 
day than expected and, the inverse for a positive one. As non-pricing variables, these are 
the only non-first logarithm difference in the model. The use of the STOXX Europe 600 is 
another deviations from previous literatures. To capture the influence of economic growth 
in carbon price movements, I decided to use this index to express the volatility in Europe 
throughout the whole period. Since the dataset comprehends a rough period for the 
financial markets in the old continent, it is expected that carbon prices are, at some degree, 
determined by changes in the production and output levels. Complementary details about 
each variable will be addressed in section 8. 
 
The “D” stands for the first difference of the logarithm of each variable (equation 2), on 
which the “L” is the lag operator. The vast majority of price related data are rather 
stationary over time. As so, for these variables changes in prices are a function of the lag of 
the price. If the price increases, the change also increases, meaning the mean and variance 
are not constant along the period.  To avoid the presence of heteroskedasticity, which will 
compromise the results of my regression, I use the following formula to assess the 1
st
 
difference of the logarithm for each pricing variable. 
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(1 − 𝐿) log(𝑋) = log  (𝑋) − log(𝑋(−1)) 
Equation 5 – First difference of the logarithm. Source: www.eviews.com 
 
In equation 1 (eq. 1) only determinants of demand are considered for this model. As 
mentioned, it is unlikely possible to quantify, on daily data, the impact of institutional 
changes such as the ones mentioned in the previous sections. To keep a wider sample, I 
decided to assess the impact of such adjustments in the EUAs price by splitting my sample 
in three distinctive ways: 
 
1. The whole sample period, from 2009 until 2016. 
2. Per compliance period, meaning the 2nd and 3rd phases. 
3. Per year during the 3rd phase, from 2013 until 2016. 
 
It is expected then, that my model will hopefully capture the impact on the price after 
amendments are applied, since they are mainly applied either per year or per compliance 
period, which will distance me from previous literature and is expected to capture 
significant changes in the coefficients of each independent variable. 
 
The precision or robustness of an OLS estimation is given by its standard error. To access 
the viability of my model, I will focus on the residuals analysis by performing a series of 
tests. the presence of serial correlation in my model will be tested by the Breusch-Godfrey 
Serial Correlation LM Test. The null hypothesis is giving by H0: pi = 0, meaning no serial 
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correlation of any order bigger than p, where p is the number of lags of the error term. If 
present, would mean that possible wrong conclusions would be made. 
To test for the presence of heteroskedasticity, I will use two different tests: the Breusch-
Pagan-Godfrey and the White’s test. The null hypothesis tests, for both, no 
heteroskedasticity against heteroskedasticity of unknown. If heteroscedasticity is present, 
the variability of the EUA Price is not constant across the regressors. 
 
The Ramsey RESET test is a classical linear regression on which the disturbance is under 
the assumption of following a multivariate normal distribution. It will test if there are non-
omitted variables, incorrect functional form and correlation between the independent 
variables and the disturbance vector. In other words, the Ramsey RESET test will provide 
intuition behind non-linear combinations of the regressors which, if present, indicates the 
model might be wrongly formulated. 
 
The Recursive Least Squares tests if residuals lay outside the standard error bands, which 
would result in instability on the equation parameters. Moreover, the CUSUM test is based 
on the sum of these recursive residuals. Once again, departures from the critical lines 
suggest coefficient instability. The CUSUM of Squares test assesses the variance stability 
of the residuals by reference to a pair of parallel straight lines around the expected value 
 
And, to evaluate the presence, or not, of a unit root, I will use the Dickey-Fuller test, more 
precisely, the Augmented version. This test shows that under the null hypothesis of a unit 
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root, its statistic does not follow a Student’s t-distribution. If the series is correlated at 
higher order lags, the assumption of white noises disturbance is violated. 
 
Further considerations regarding the empirical methodology and results interpretation will 
be addressed in sections 9 and 10. 
8. Data 
The data sample comprehends a period starting in 12-October-2009 until 25-November-
2016, a total of 1743 observations. The historical end-of-day EU ETS Spot Price and the 
STOXX Europe 600 was downloaded through a Bloomberg terminal, with the last price 
“PX_LAST” mnemonic, as the last day quote and non-trading days were excluded. As 
properly highlighted before, I used the secondary market quote provided by EEX to avoid 
sample size restrictions and perform a as much realistic model as possible. 
 
The same mechanism was then used to retrieve the end of the day quote for all energy 
related variables, ICE Brent Futures, Belgium Zeebrugge Natural Gas, CIF ARA Steam 
Coal Index, German’s and U.K.’s baseload power price on high voltage grid network. For 
each one I downloaded the last price of the month-ahead futures contract and converted the 
non-Euro prices with the official exchange rate. Future implications of this procedure will 
be addressed last chapter. 
While ICE Brent Futures are widely accepted by academic researches as the most liquid 
and traded crude oil contract in Europe
23
, there is no consensus when discussing the same 
                                                 
23 www.theice.com/publicdocs/ICE_Crude_Refined_Oil_Products.pdf 
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for Natural Gas or Coal contracts. As so, I decided to follow previous literature on this 
topic and based my research on the contracts stated before, alongside with S&P Global 
Platts
24
 recommendations, which considers UK and German dark spreads based on CIF 
ARA Steam Coal. Regarding the gas-based spreads I decided to use the Belgian Zeebrugge 
gas as reference, since IP4C considers the same in their methodology, which will then be 
consistent with the clean spark spreads methodology used. Both temperature indices were 
calculated thanks to Bloomberg’s Actual Observed Temperature Index. Each value is 
referred to the average temperature observed in the whole country, either Germany or the 
U.K., during the period from 6 a.m. until 11 p.m. 
9. Results 
All the following results were computed on Eviews (Econometric Views).
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 Before 
discussing the outcomes and their interpretation, I would like to point out some interesting 
behaviors of my variables during the period under study. The EUA Spot price, shown in 
figure 5, has two separated trends between 2009 and 2016. The first, a downward trend 
starting in 2011 until 2013, showing the evidence of the new adjustments on the legislation 
of the EU ETS as, after the EUA Spot Price seems to increase at a stable rate, if the price 
drop to zero in May 2015 is ignored, until the beginning of 2016. Due to these different 
behaviors, it is highly expected that the regressors’ coefficients and even the explanatory 
variables themselves change accordingly. 






Fig. 5 – EUA Spot Price. Line & Symbol Eviews’ graph. 
Furthermore, when considering the first difference of the logarithm (figure 6), it is even 
more clear the higher volatile period during the compliance brake. There are some other 
periods with high volatility, mainly during the first months, which might be related to the 
newly adjustments made by the regulators. 
 
Fig. 6 – EUA 1st logarithm difference. Line & Symbol Eviews’ graph. 
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Table 2 in the appendix shows the plot of the 1
st
 logarithm difference of the EUA prices. As 
common in other historical financial data, due the Kurtosis > 3 and Skewness   0, I reject 
the null hypothesis of the normality test for the dependent variable. In fact, this is a non-
symmetric distribution, in the presence of a “leptokurtic” distribution or, in other words, fat 
tails, meaning it is more clustered around the mean.
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 Moreover, the negative Skewness is 
emphasized on the left tail, i.e., the distribution is concentrated on the right side and the 
mode is greater than the arithmetic mean. 
 
Regarding the energy based variables, figure 7 shows the distribution over time for the 
main variables under study. On the opposite of the EUA Spot price, the month-ahead prices 
for most of the energy independent variables show an upward trend during the 1
st
 
compliance period and a downward trend during the 3
rd
 phase. The significant drop in the 
ICE Brent Futures price, due to the 2014 oil crisis seems to drag other prices down, 
especially in the case of the natural gas due to the high correlation between both (table 3). 
In fact, it is expected due to the correlation between some regressors, e.g., Brent and 
Natural Gas is about 0.76 or, for the temperature indices correlation is about 0.61, some of 
the variables will not be statistical significant and need to be set apart of the final model. 





Fig. 7 – Month-ahead energy prices. Line & Symbol Eviews’ graph. 
Finally, table 4 in the appendix shows the descriptive statistics for each variable. While, for 
all the variables the normality null hypothesis is also rejected, which is in line with previous 
literature and it is rather common among economic data with bigger samples, the standard 
deviation is below 0.10 for all except for the temperature indices, which are not in the 1
st
 
logarithm difference. For the remaining results, I will consider 5% as my confidence 
interval.  
In accordance with what was expected, table 5 shows the OLS regression output for the 
whole period and considering all the variables under the scope of my research. Since the p-
value for the D(NATURALGAS), D(CDSUK), D(SSDE), D(SSUK), D(SP), TDE, TUK are 
higher than 2.5%, these are not statistically significant, meaning they will not be taken part 
in this research since they have no explanatory power. 
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These results are somehow surprising considering previous literature, which for example 
shows statistically significance levels for their weather. In my understanding, these means 
the simple dispersion of today’s observed temperatures against the mean temperature is not 
a determinant factor of the EUA price. As adjustments were made in the core legislation of 
the EU ETS, it is fair to assume this effect was then corrected. Regardless further 
developments can be made to properly replicate the impact of such phenomenon.  
 
In the next sections, I will start by analyzing the adjusted OLS regression for the whole 
period and then by splitting the sample and re-adjust the model, if necessary, for the 
remaining periods, in accordance with the methodology previously described. 
9.1 OLS: whole sample 2009-2016 
After dropping from eq. 1 the non-significant variables, the final OLS regression for the 
period under research is the following. 
𝐷(𝑬𝑼𝑨) = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝐷(𝑩𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕) + 𝛾𝐷(𝑪𝒐𝒂𝒍) + 𝜂𝐷(𝑷𝑷𝑫𝑬) + 𝜃𝐷(𝑷𝑷𝑼𝑲) + 𝜄𝐷(𝑪𝑫𝑺𝑫𝑬) + 𝜈𝐷(𝑺𝟔𝟎𝟎) +  𝜖 
Equation 6 – OLS regression for the whole period. 
The results shown in table 6 are according with the expectations. The low R-squared value 
(about 0.102) is explained by the turmoil of all variables under scope. From 2009 until 
2016 there were several abnormal events which might lead to the results presented. From 
the financial crisis, still installed in the European economy, to the Crude Oil crisis starting 
in 2014, which led to an historical low-price for the Brent Oil, the volatility of the energy 
dependent variables was highly affected, resulting in unusual patterns during the last couple 
of years. By analyzing figure 7 it is possible to affirm that these dysfunctional price 
behaviors of the last year is even more clear. 
 36 
The Baseload Power Price in Germany has a coefficient of 0.49, higher than all the 
remaining regressors, which emphasizes the EUA price dependence on the German market. 
There is also a negative correlation between the EUA price and the German Clean Dark 
Spread alongside with the CIF ARA Steam Coal price, which was also expected due to the 
simple logic that if the price of one of the raw materials associated with high emissions 
decreases, the EUA price increases in reaction to a cheaper access to it. Finally, the effects 
of institutional changes are still to be made, as it is not possible yet to analyze the impact on 
the EUA price within the whole period. For that, the next sections will provide a more 
concrete explanation.  
9.2 OLS: second phase 2009 – 2013 
 
For the 2nd phase of the EU ETS, the OLS regression shows an even lower R-squared 
value (0.08), meaning my regressors fail to properly explain the price movements between 
this period of the EUA price. Table 7 shows the OLS output generated by Eviews and, 
while it was fair to expect that more variables were statistically significant, the exact 
opposite happened. Only the German Baseload Power Price, the STOXX Europe 600 and 
the German Clean Dark Spread have a p-value lower than 2.5%. 
The only apparent reason for these results is the downward trend observed from 2011 until 
the end of the 2nd phase. From 2011 until the end of the compliance period, the price 
dropped more than 38% and, if we consider the same metric just form May 2011 until 
November 2011, a 6-month period on which the price decreased almost 50%. 
Taking these results into account, it is now evident that the final stage of the 2nd phase was 
highly impactful in the EUA price. Moreover, if I isolate the firs years under study, from 
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2009 until May 2011, the U.K. Clean Spark Spread is now statistically significant, while 
the macroeconomic proxy is not. The R-squared (table 8) increased to 0.14, which 
underlines the impact of the high percentage of free allocation during this period. Then, it is 
possible to assume that the EU as regulator had tremendous impact in the EUA price, which 
was highly expected considering it was still implementing and testing new safety measures 
to avoid price instability. 
9.3 OLS: third phase 2013 – 2016 
 
By avoiding the EU ETS highly unstable program during the 2nd phase, especially the 
downward trend mentioned before, I expect a more stable and self-explanatory model for 
the current stage. As so, table 8 in the appendix show the OLS regression outputs for the 
3rd compliance period, from 2013 until the last observable date, 25th of November 2016.  
 
Even considering the anomaly observed on May 2015, on which the EUA priced dropped 
to 0, the R-squared is slightly higher for the current compliance period (about 0.10). The 
ICE Brent Futures and CIF ARA Steam Coal are statistically significant once again, which 
is somehow surprising considering the oil crisis, which started in 2014. 
 
Both the Coal and German Clean Dark Spread still have a negative coefficient, coherent 
with the reasoning made before. On the other hand, the STOXX Europe 600, as the 
macroeconomic proxy is not significant once again, underlining the impact of the European 
crisis on the explanatory power of my model. It is also possible to assume that the index 
chosen either failed as an economic proxy of the industrial level and production or the 
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volatility observed ended up to have a direct influence in the results. For future research on 
this topic, other proxies might be considered. 
 
Even if the results are still underwhelming, the impact of the legislation amends on the EU 
ETS is still observable on the price volatility of the EUA secondary market, with a more 
stable upward pattern which was the main objective of regulators. 
 
The next section concludes the OLS analysis by splitting the last compliance period per 
year, which will isolate external impacts previously highlighted. 
9.4 OLS: third phase, year by year 
In the first year of the 3rd compliance period, the OLS model shows surprising results 
(table 10). Besides the increasing of the R-squared (almost 21%), which by itself shows a 
more powerful explanatory model, the inclusion of the Belgian Natural Gas as one of the 
statistically significant regressors, is the main take away from this year, alongside with the 
dropping the ICE Brent Futures series from the independent variables list. With the same 
coefficient signal of the Steam Coal series, the cheaper the Natural Gas is, the higher the 
EUA price, reflecting the tendency of the market to prevent GHG emissions. On the other 
hand, the positive relationship between the U.K. Clean Spark Spread and the EUA price is 
puzzling as it seems to indicate the benefits from switching from a coal based plant to a gas 
one, even if the switching price variable remains non-significant. The idea is if the EUA 
price increases and, due to the higher emission factor coefficient of a coal-based power 
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plant, there is an evident incentive for producers to switch to a more cleaner energy source, 
resulting in the opposite coefficient shown in table 10. 
 
To conclude the observations regarding 2013 OLS results, the more stable pattern of the 
EUA price, mainly due to the changes in the Cap size available, the incorporation of price 
constrain measures and the devolvement of auctions as the main tool obtain a permit 
allowed for other external variables to explain price movements better than before, 
underlining the widely expected importance of legislation on the EU ETS. 
 
On the other hand, in 2014 the explanatory power of the OLS regression decreased to about 
14%. While, the Natural Gas proxy variable was once again non-significant, the U.K. 
Baseload Power Price was also not significant due to its high p-value. For the first time in 
this research, both Clean Dark Spreads are significant within this period, emphasizing the 
importance of Steam Coal prices and the gross profit of power plants when accessing the 
settlement price of the EUA secondary market. It seems the driven power of such indices 
and variables is highly related with hedging purposes, as the largest emitters are necessary 
interested in securing their investment and profits. Finally, the beginning of the oil crisis 
has a direct impact on almost whole energy prices, especially on Natural Gas, which 
ultimately will influence the results, driving results to a lower level. 
 
When accessing the results for 2015, the remarkably lower R-squared, 0.07, is possibly 
related with the epicenter of the oil crisis, as energy prices reached low historical figures. 
Table 11 shows the ultimate impact of the energy crisis as not a single variable is 
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significant. The drop to zero in May 2015 is also non-relevant since, even if I exclude those 
two days, there is no increase in the explanatory power of the empirical model. The 
abnormal results are then purely related with changes in the external variables, since there 
were no legislative changes in the EU ETS and the pattern of the spot price seems stable 
enough to assume so. 
 
Finally, for 2016 the results are astonishing high, with an R-squared of almost 45%. While 
the relative low number of observations (208) might indicate bias and higher results, there 
is no reason to think so as the time space used was close to the previous ones and if I extend 
the sample for 2-years period results remain high. Equation 12 shows the final OLS output 
with the substituted coefficients. 
 
D(EUA) = 0.392186216059*D(BRENT) - 0.474599109907*D(COAL) + 0.834416065609*D(PPDE) + 
0.206078281731*D(PPUK) - 0.0586547464128*D(CDSDE) + 0.0573712885302*D(SSUK) 
Equation 7 – OLS estimation with substituted coefficients. Generated by Eviews. 
 
On contrast to what was seen with the OLS estimation for 2014, the U.K. Clean Spark 
Spread has a positive coefficient, while the German Clean Dark Spread is negative. The 
increase explanatory power of the regressors seems to be correlated with the upward trend 
of energy related prices, as oil started to recover from its historical low. German Baseload 
Power Price reached an historical low as well but, in contrast, both the Steam Coal proxy 
and U.K. Baseload Power Price increased exponentially in 2016. These observed high 
variances seem to drive the EUA price, alongside with the lower Cap allowed on auctions 
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and the reinforcement of price constrain measures on the EU ETS scope. Nevertheless, the 
remarkable high explanatory power of the model is beyond expected, especially 
considering the lower observed values for previous periods. While energy prices recover, I 
consider the more stable environment under the EU ETS to be also decisive, as non-
institutional determinants gain more preponderance in explaining EUA price movements.  
9.5 Robustness Tests 
In accordance with section 7, to access the robustness and the viability of my model I will 
focus on testing the OLS residuals, generated for the whole period under study. Figure 8 
below shows the OLS residuals plot generated with Eviews. 
 
Fig. 8 – OLS residuals, actual and fitted. 
The high values of variability of the residuals, especially around the compliance break and 
during other unstable market periods indicate the possible violation of constant variance. 
Also, in the presence of high variability, the normality hypothesis might also be violated. 
As table 14 describes, I do reject that the OLS residuals are normally distributed due to 
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Kurtosis > 3 and Skewness  0. As highlighted before, I expected this results due to the 
simple nature of the variables under study. For further research, the inclusion of dummy 
variables might help to correct for non-normality. Ultimately, a model which does not 
assumes normality could also be tested. 
 
The Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test with 1 lag (table 15) shows that I do not 
reject the null hypothesis, p-value > 2.5%, meaning there is no serial correlation. This test 
allows to infer that, in principle, the coefficient estimates derived are not bias and the 
standard errors were appropriated generated. However, the inclusion of more than 1 lag 
violates the assumption that the variables are non-stochastic. 
 
Table 16 shows the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Heteroskedasticity test on the OLS residuals. 
Due to a high p-value (0.14) I do not reject the null hypothesis, meaning there is the 
presence of homoscedasticity. In other words, the error term or the “noise” in the 
relationship between the independent variables and the EUA Spot Price is the same across 
all values of the regressors. Therefore, it is possible to assume the coefficients are efficient 
and unbiased. The same reasoning is verified by the White test (table 17). Since p-value > 
2.5%, I do not reject the null hypothesis, hence the square residuals are a function of the 
regressors. If Heteroskedasticity was present, the standard errors could infer inappropriate 
results and further considerations could also be misleading. However, as in both tests we 
reject Heteroskedasticity, there is no need for further corrections in the model. 
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Figure 9 shows the test based on the recursive least squares residuals. While for most of the 
period, the confidence interval of the initial parameter covers the confidence interval for the 
remaining periods, it is possible to observe expected fluctuations around the compliance 
break due to the higher variance previously mentioned. 
 
Fig. 9 – Recursive residuals tests generated by Eviews. 
The CUSUM test (figure 10) makes a comparison between the cumulative sum of the 
standardized residual with 0. Since the parameters are constant, I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis, i.e., no break in the conditional mean. 
 
Fig. 10 – Eview’s CUSUM test created with Eviews. 
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However, it is important to notice that for almost the whole period values are negative. 
 
To analyze the constant variance, I performed the CUSUM of Squares test (figure 11). The 
departures from the significance interval indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis, 
meaning that there might be a measurement error with the explanatory variables, i.e., they 
are non-stochastic and observations on independent variables are fixed in repeated samples. 
 
Fig. 11 – CUSUM of Squares test, generated by Eviews. 
The Ramsey RESET test (table 18) analyses the possibility of misspecification of 
functional form. Once again, due to the high p-value (about 0.34) I do not reject linearity.  
 
Finally, Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (table 19), which accesses the presence of a unit 
root, I do reject the null hypothesis for the 1
st
 logarithm difference, meaning the series is 
non-stationary and results are not spurious. 
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10. Conclusion 
The results of this research show empirical evidence on the impact of several external 
variables on the EUA Spot Price. For the whole sample period, between 2009 and 2016, the 
price of the month-ahead Brent and Coal contracts, alongside with the Power Price 
practiced in Germany and in the U.K. are statistically significant, which is on line with 
previous literature. The economic growth proxy used, STOXX Europe 600 index is also 
significant, emphasizing the impact of the European economy on the EUA price and the 
Clean Dark Spread in Germany remains an important price drive factor during the whole 
period. 
 
However, due to multiple changes in the EU ETS legislation and the unstable period, the 
model lacks sufficient explanatory power to be able to forecast future prices. Previous 
literature emphasizes the impact of extreme weather conditions on the EUA price, which is 
not verified for the period under study. Moreover, when the sample is divided by 
compliance period and then per year, results are significantly different. Not only the 
explanatory power of the model increases, especially in the 3rd phase of the EU ETS, but 
also the significant variables change, with the inclusion of Natural Gas and the Clean Dark 
and Spark Spreads, both for Germany and U.K. These, suggests the adjustments made by 
regulators on the core of the scheme reduced the impact of institutional changes in the EUA 
Spot price, allowing it to have a more independent behavior. The robustness tests provide 
statistical proof that the results are not spurious and the majority of the OLS regression 
assumptions are verified.  
 46 
 
For further research on this topic, I would recommend to investigate the impact of several 
macroeconomic indicators and avoid the use of both a proxy and extreme weather proxies. 
Since I did the conversion to Euro whenever necessary, it is possible the effect of monetary 
policy might be implicit in the model, thus need to be taking in consideration. Finally, 
institutional changes are still to be fully weighted, even if results indicate the impact of 
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Table 1 – Global Warming Potential Index. Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. 
GHG GLOBAL WARMING POTENTIAL 
CARBON DIOXIDE 1 
METHANE 25 
NITROUS OXIDE 298 
HYDROFLUROCARBONS 124 - 14,800 
PERFLUORCARBONS 7390 - 12,200 
SULFUR HEXAFLUORIDE 22,800 
NITROGEN TRIFLUORIDE 17,200 
  
 
Table 2 – Normality test of the 1
st
 Logarithm difference of the EUA, generated with Eviews 
software. 
 






Table 4 – Descriptive statistics, generated with Eviews. 
 
 
Table 5 – OLS regression for the whole 
period and accounting with all dependent 
variables. 






Table 7 – Adjusted OLS regression for the 2
nd
 
phase of the EU ETS. 
Table 8 – Adjusted OLS regression from 2009 




Table 9 – Adjusted OLS regression for the 





































Table 14 – Normality test of the OLS residuals. 
 
 
Table 15 – Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation 
LM Test. 






Table 17 – Heteroskedasticity Test: White 
test. 
 





Table 19 – Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. 
 
 
 
